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In this paper we apply social network analysis to study the boards of directors of 107 large 
listed Russian firms between 2009 and 2014. Traditional corporate governance metrics, such 
as demographic characteristics, experience, or multiple directorships, confirm that the boards 
of Russian firms show greater independence and are more well-qualified than before. We also 
find a decrease in the centrality of directors, which corroborates the diminishing concentration 
of power of some directors. The most connected firms have a specific profile since they are 
larger, have lower market valuations, and stronger ties with government (both due to higher 
proportions of government owned shares and a greater number of directors who are former 
politicians). Our findings also demonstrate that the boards of financial institutions are less con-
nected, whereas political and independent directors are more centralized.
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INTRODUCTION
The Russian Corporate Governance (CG) sys-
tem was created after the transition from 
a planned economy to a market one in condi-
tions of crisis [Goriaev, Zabotkin, 2006]. 
Since then, CG indicators, such as the propor-
tion of independent directors, the number of 
board meetings and board size, have signifi-
cantly grown [Enikolopov, Stepanov, 2013; 
Lazareva et al., 2008].
However, traditional CG indicators, sug-
gested by the agency theory, only describe 
the tip of the iceberg for Russian companies. 
It is common for firms in emerging econo-
mies to face resource scarcity as formal in-
stitutions fail and markets are underdevel-
oped. In such a  context, the resource de-
pendence view, which posits that knowledge, 
 expertise and relationships of directors can 
provide a firm with critical resources, offers 
a  sound theoretical foundation [Pfeffer, 
Salancik, 2003]. According to this view, 
director connections with other companies 
are particularly important, given a firms’ 
need for more links to the external environ-
ment in emerging markets.
The importance of director connections 
in emerging countries has given rise to the 
empirical analysis of networks in Brazil 
[Mendes-da-Silva, 2011], India [De, 2012], 
South Africa [Durbach, Parker, 2009], Chile 
[Silva, Majluf, Paredes, 2006], Thailand 
[Sitthipongpanich, Polsiri, 2015], and 
Taiwan [Chan et al., 2017]. As for Russia, 
S. Michailova and V. Worm argue that per-
sonal connections have existed for centuries 
and remain extremely important in modern 
companies since they are “products of spe-
cific cultural heritages” [Michailova, Worm, 
2003]. However, despite wide-ranging dis-
cussion in the theoretical literature, net-
works of Russian directors have yet to be 
empirically explored. Do Russian director 
connections differ from those in other de-
veloping markets? How do Russian firms 
address market conditions using director 
connections? What kinds of directors are 
felt to be the most important resources? 
Our paper represents the first step towards 
quantitatively analysing Russian boards’ 
connections.
In our analysis we apply the Social Net-
works Analysis (SNA) technique. This pro-
vides detailed information about a direc-
tor’s place in the network and the extent 
of the benefits that can be derived [Singh, 
Delios, 2017]. The chosen metrics determine 
number of connections that directors have 
(degree centrality), extent to which they 
act as mediators between other firms with-
in a network (betweenness centrality), close-
ness to other firms in the network (closeness 
centrality), as well as importance of the 
neighbouring directors (eigenvector central-
ity). We also analyse whether certain types 
of directors are more important in the net-
work than others. Particular attention is 
paid to the directors that affiliated with 
financial institutions, as well as directors 
in government- and oligarch-owned compa-
nies that are considered to be valuable in 
the Russian business environment. 
We examine a sample of 107 large list-
ed Russian companies between 2009 and 
2014. Since economic turbulence may lead 
to major changes in the network [Withers, 
Kim, Howard, 2018], we choose the period 
between two crises: the world economic cri-
sis of 2008 and the Russian financial crisis 
that commenced in late 2014. The unit of 
observation is an individual director, while 
each firm employs up to 22 directors. Thus, 
the total sample includes 6,729 director-
year observations. 
The main contribution of the paper is 
the analysis of director networks among 
Russian firms using the resource depend-
ence view and applying the social network 
analysis technique. Although this descrip-
tive approach could be seen as restrictive, 
the relevance of research derives not only 
from the fact that CG is a promising field 
for the application of social networks, but 
also because the Russian environment is 
characterized by the importance of rela-
tions. The social network approach might 
prove more useful in this environment than 
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in most developed capital markets on which 
previous inquiries have focused. Similar to 
the descriptive papers [Mendes-da-Silva, 
2011; Durbach, Parker, 2009] that analyse 
director networks in emerging countries, 
we aim to develop a point of reference for 
future works on the Russian market as well 
as other emerging ones.
The remainder of the paper is as follows. 
Section 1 provides the fundamental expla-
nations of the importance of networks of 
directors and the theoretical foundations 
underlying the impact of connections on 
corporate governance. Section 2 introduc-
es the methodology of network metrics. Section 
3 describes the sample and some character-
istics of the firms studied. Section 4 reports 
and discusses the results of the analysis 
using descriptive statistics and means com-
parisons. The final section concludes and 
provides a number of future directions for 
research.
1. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Among corporate governance mechanisms, 
the Board of Directors (BoD hereinafter) 
emerges as the apex of the system and is the 
focus of international public authority efforts 
to enhance CG [Iwasaki, 2014; Steckler, 
Clark, 2019]. The BoD plays a  twofold role 
in large firms: monitoring and supervising 
managers on behalf of shareholders and act-
ing as a valuable source of knowledge, finance 
and other intangible resources for the firm 
[Adams, Hermalin, Weisbach, 2010; Lai, 
Chen, Song, 2019]. Dependent on which role 
is more prominent, two main theories have 
been advocated as foundations of BoD stud-
ies: the agency theory and the resource de-
pendence view [Chen, Hsu, Chang, 2016; 
Schiehll, Martins, 2016; Zona, Boyd, Takacs 
Haynes, 2019]. The agency theory underlines 
the conflicts of interests between managers 
and shareholders and stresses how directors 
monitor managers in order to protect share-
holder interests. In this context, director 
independence emerges as a key issue. However 
it should be noted that independent directors 
usually serve on several boards, which may 
lead to a reduction in efficiency.
Studies on developed markets usually de-
scribe a trade-off between the costs and ben-
efits of hiring busy directors through the lens 
of agency theory. Fich and Shivdasani show 
how directors serving on multiple boards are 
overcommitted, which may result in poor firm 
performance [Fich, Shivdasani, 2006]. 
Devos, Prevost and Puthenpurackal conclude 
that US firms with lower industry-adjusted 
performance are more likely to have interlock-
ing directors [Devos, Prevost, Puthenpu-
rackal, 2009]. In the German market, firms 
with more embedded boards have been found 
to perform worse [Andres, van den Bongard, 
Lehmann, 2013; Böhler, Rapp, Wolff, 2010]. 
Evidence consistent with this result has been 
found for Japanese firms [Kawai, Ko, 2012]. 
In contrast, the literature reporting the pos-
itive effects of multiple directorships has 
usually studied future rather than current 
firm performance [Horton, Millo, Serafeim, 
2012; Larcker, So, Wang, 2013].
The resource dependence view focuses 
on which resources directors bring to the 
company, among which connections play 
a key role [Madhani, 2017]. From this point 
of view, attention should be paid to which 
characteristics of directors serve to  amplify 
the firm’s network. Prior research [Zona, 
Gomez-Mejia, Withers, 2018; Blanco-
Alcántara, Díez-Esteban, Romero-Merino, 
2018] state that while agency theory is more 
applicable when resources are abundant, 
the resource dependence view has more 
explanatory power for resource constraints, 
as is the case of emerging markets like Russia. 
In such a scenario, connected directors can 
bring resources that help to overcome mar-
ket frictions, provide self-generated insti-
tutional support, leverage bureaucratic con-
nections, and influence the media [Cárdenas, 
2015; Purkayastha, Ma nolova, Edelman, 
2012; Yigit, Behram, 2013]. Empirical evi-
dence on the effect of director networks in 
emerging countries supports the idea that 
such networks are far more beneficial when 
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compared to developed countries. Director 
connections have a  positive effect on per-
formance in Chinese [Qiao, Fung, Ju, 2013], 
Chilean [Silva, Majluf, Paredes, 2006], Thai 
[Sit thipongpanich, Polsiri, 2015], Colombian 
[Pombo, Gutiérrez, 2011], and Indian firms 
[Singh, Delios, 2017]. However, the findings 
of [Kim, 2005] and [Santos, da Silveira, 
Barros, 2012] suggest there is a breakpoint 
in the “busyness” of directors after which 
it may prove detrimental to corporate per-
formance.
2. METHODOLOGY
The literature usually employs three main 
measures to study BoD: the number of di-
rectorships, the interlocks, and social net-
works. The first measure only accounts for 
the number of boards on which a particular 
director serves and the term “busyness” has 
been coined to describe the situation in which 
a director is included on several boards  — 
usually more than three [Andres, van den 
Bongard, Lehmann, 2013; Core, Holthausen, 
Larcker, 1999]. Director interlock happens 
when an insider of one firm serves as an 
outside director of another or vice versa. 
Some researchers analyse more specific cas-
es, such as reciprocal interlocks of CEOs 
[Fich, White, 2005], ownership-director in-
terlocks [Bohman, 2012; Comet, Pizarro, 
2011], or corporate linear triples, whereby 
two corporations share directors with the 
board of the third firm [Hayden, Garner, 
Hoffman, 2013].
The third set of metrics borrows the so-
cial network analysis technique and usually 
uses four main indicators (degree centrality, 
betweenness centrality, closeness centrality, 
and eigenvector centrality) to assess involve-
ment in a  network and the relative impor-
tance of a  given node1 [Chuluun, Prevost, 
Puthenpurackal, 2014; Freeman, 1978; 
Schonlau, Singh, 2009]. This approach, re-
cently applied in corporate governance anal-
1  In our paper, each node represents one director.
ysis, outperforms other techniques since it 
uniquely captures several dimensions of 
connections, such as the quality of the con-
nections and the position of each direc-
tor’s  connections within the network [Bar-
nea, Guedj, 2007].
Director interactions with one another 
via formal (that is, board meetings) and in-
formal contacts create a network. According 
to the literature, formal contacts have the 
advantage of not being affected by person-
al biases. M. S. Granovetter posits that for-
mal contacts influence performance even 
more that informal ones do [Granovetter, 
1973]. Also, formal contacts are seen as a 
good proxy for their informal counter-
parts [Andres, van den Bongard, Lehmann, 
2013]. Further, directors who are well-con-
nected in terms of formally determined ties, 
can also be well-connected in terms of in-
formal contacts outside the boardroom. That 
is why the paper focuses on formal director 
connections: two directors are connected if 
they are included in the same board. Companies 
become connected when they share members 
of company boards. Fig.  1 shows how a  di-
rector network appears. Fig. 1.a represents 
the links between three companies (1–3) and 
seven board directors (A–G). Fig. 1.b reports 
formal connections between directors A–G 
formed by their serving on the same board.
Degree centrality is one of the most in-
tuitive measures and is defined as the num-
ber of links a given director has, i.e., with 
how many different directors he or she is 
in direct contact with through sitting on 
the same board. Directors with more con-
nections tend to have more power and to 
be more visible. However, degree does not 
take into account indirect relationships and 
a  director’s  importance in knowledge dif-
fusion. Fig. 1 shows how each of the direc-
tors A, F and G, has only two connections, 
so their degree of centrality equals 2. Director 
E  has the highest degree, equal to 5.
Betweenness centrality quantifies the num-
ber of times a  given director is the shortest 
path between two other directors. The under-
lying idea concerns how many pairs of direc-
33Networks of directors on Russian boards: The hidden part of the corporate governance iceberg
РЖМ  18 (1): 29–50 (2020)
tors the analysed director has to go through 
to reach another in the smallest number of 
steps. Thus, it can be viewed as a measure of 
the control a  director can have on the com-
munication between two other directors. 
Betweenness measures a  director’s  ability to 
bridge subnetworks.
Closeness centrality is the average length 
of the shortest path between a director and 
all the other directors on the boards of 
Russian firms. The more central a  director 
is, the closer he or she is to all other direc-
tors. Consequently, closeness can be regard-
ed as a  measure of how long it will take to 
spread information or influence from one 
director to all the other directors sequen-
tially. Closeness and betweenness character-
ise a  position of a  director in the network 
that is important to identify the extent of 
benefits that a firm can derive [Singh, Delios, 
2017].
Eigenvector centrality is a  measure of 
the influence of a  director in the network 
of Russian directors and is founded on the 
idea that not all directors are equally im-
portant or influential. Eigenvector central-
ity assigns relative scores to all the directors 
in the network based on the concept that 
connections to high-scoring directors con-
tribute more to scores than equal connec-
tions to low-scoring directors. The higher 
a  director’s  eigenvector score, the more he 
or she is connected to other directors who 
themselves have high scores. In other words, 
it estimates the popularity of a director’s di-
rect connections.
The definitions of the variables, terms 
related to network analysis, and formulas 
to calculate centrality metrics are provided 
in Appendix  1.
3. SAMPLE
The database used in this research includes 
large listed Russian companies whose shares 
are actively traded. The sample consists of 
633  firm-year observations from 107  firms, 
which are included at least once in the Moscow 
Exchange Broad Market Index (MICEX BMI) 
between 2009 and 2014. This index consists 
of the top 100  shares, selected by liquidity, 
capitalization and free-float. Since the unit of 
observation is a  director, and each firm em-
ploys up to 22  directors, the sample consists 
of 6 729 director-year observations.
A number of different sources was used to 
collect the data. Financial information was 
gathered using the Ruslana database provid-
ed by Bureau van Dijk2. Information on board 
2  https://ruslana.bvdep.com/
Fig.  1. A  scheme of board directors’ networks
B a s e d  o n:  [Mendes-Da-Silva, 2011].
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compositions was collected from the compa-
nies’ websites and annual reports. Personal 
details on board members were hand-collected 
from annual reports and websites containing 
information on leading Russian managers.
Table 1 outlines the descriptive statistics 
of the firms included in the sample. According 
to the data, 4.39% of shares are held by the 
State, similar to the 3.32% reported in [Mu-
ravyev, Berezinets, Ilina, 2014]. This figure 
is driven by the state holding a large fraction 
of shares in some companies since the me-
dian state stake is close to zero. The mean 
shares held by large shareholders (so-called 
oligarchs) is 8.01%, although the median 
equals 0. Both state and large shareholder 
ownership display major inequality within 
the sample.
The median firm in the sample has less 
debt than equity, and an equity market price 
almost equal to its book value. The low lev-
el of leverage and market-to-book value found 
in Russian firms as compared to European 
or US companies can be explained by refer-
ence to the underdevelopment of Russian fi-
nancial markets and their idiosyncratic cor-
porate finance. Debt is usually considered to 
be the most risky and expensive source of 
funds. Thus, Russian firms rely primarily on 
retained earnings and do not incur debt un-
til they have depleted their internal funds.
Almost 70% of the sample are companies 
from the energy, chemical and manufactur-
ing industries (Fig. 2). The sample industry 
structure resembles the Russian economy, 
i.e. one that is known for the prevalence of 
the oil and gas sector and manufacturing. 
Most of the companies are located in Moscow 
and Saint-Petersburg (57%). The other 43% 




Table 2 provides demographic information 
on directors and their educational attain-
ments.
A director in the network is, on average, 
48 years old and male. A. Muravyev reports 
an average age of 45.4 [Muravyev, 2017]. 
Our sample of Russian directors is slightly 
younger than their European or American 
counterparts. The averages are: 59 years old 
for French directors, 61 for German, and 
62.6 for American directors [SpencerStuart, 
2018]. In recent years, the average age of 
Russian directors has, however, tended to 
increase. From the point of view of the re-
source dependence theory, this tendency has 
Table 1
Descriptive statistics of the sample
Variable Mean Median Std. Dev. Min Max
Leverage 1.44 0.70 2.90 0.01 36.39
Age 20.09 14.00 22.17 1.00 126.00
Size 8.01 7.70 1.42 4.76 12.62
ROIC 0.10 0.07 0.13 –0.29 0.82
Price-to-book value 1.57 1.01 1.66 0.06 10.99
Share of Government ownership (%) 4.39 0.10 15.81 0.00 100.00
Share of large shareholder (%) 8.10 0.00 21.46 0.00 86.63
N o t e :  leverage is calculated as the ratio of debt to equity book value. Age is the number of years since the 
creation of the firm. Size is measured as a  logarithm of book value. Return on invested capital (ROIC) is calcu-
lated as the ratio of net operating profit after taxes to the invested capital of the previous period. Price-to-book 
value is defined as the equity market value to book value ratio. Share of government ownership represents a per-
centage of state owners of a  company shares (both direct and indirect). n  =  380.
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a  positive implication for firms since older 
(and supposedly more experienced) directors 
bring more valuable resources to the firm in 
the form of outside connections. Although 
the issue lies beyond the scope of this re-
search, the proportion of female directors 
(9%) is very low.
Table 3 reports statistics on directors’ lev-
els of experience and “busyness”.
A  high proportion of directors (around 
76%) have work experience within the indus-
try in which the company operates. Further, 
almost half of the directors have been a CEO 
at some point. International experience in-
creases year upon year, while the share of 
politically connected directors decreases. The 
data suggest that between 21% and 28% of 
directors have experience working abroad. 
Although this percentage is lower than in 
most European countries, it may reflect im-
proved CG in large Russian companies, giv-
en that people with international experience 
may have a broader view and apply knowledge 
that differs from Russian practices. Once 
again, Russian directors seem to bring valu-
able resources (in terms of international ex-
perience) to the firm. At the same time, the 
decrease in the share of government experi-
ence means that political connections are 
becoming less important when it comes to 
managing large companies. Despite being less 
Table 2
Directors’ background  
and demographic statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Age 48.37 10.99 22.00 85.00
Higher education 
(at least one 
degree)
0.30 – – –
Number  
of degrees
0.41 0.68 0.00 2.00
MBA degree 0.10 – – –
Proportion  
of women 
0.09 – – –
N o t e:  n  = 6512.
Fig.  2. Industry structure of the sample
Fig.  3. Location of companies
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connected, these directors are likely to be 
more independent from political pressures 
and, thus, have a  greater possibility for in-
dependent oversight of managers. The per-
centage of newly appointed directors remains 
quite stable at around 20%. The average num-
ber of boards on which directors sit has fall-
en from 2.59 to 2.32. Given the limited pos-
sibility of performing one’s duties efficient-
ly when sitting on many boards, the agency 
approach suggests that the decrease in the 
number of multiple directorships may result 
in improved CG.
Table 4 contains some firm-level descrip-
tive statistics of boards, including size of 
the board, proportion of busy directors, pro-
portion of independent directors, and propor-
tion of interlocked directors.
The average board of a large, listed Russian 
company contains approximately ten direc-
tors, which is consistent with the nine direc-
tors reported in [Dolgopyatova, 2003]. Among 
the largest European countries, the average 
size varies between eight directors in Poland 
and 13.9 in France [SpencerStuart, 2018]. In 
turn, if the size of the board could be viewed 
as a proxy of boardroom talent, Russian firms 
are in an intermediate position relative to 
other European firms.
The independent director is a member of 
a  board who does not have a  material or 
pecuniary relationship with the firm. With 
the exception of 2014, the share of inde-
pendent directors has risen each year, which 
is also a  sign of the board’s improved abil-
ity to supervise managers. The proportion 
of independent directors ranges between 25% 
and 32%, which is slightly lower than the 
data of [Iwasaki, 2008; 2013; 2014], and is 
consistent with figures from the survey of 
[Frye, Iwasaki, 2011]. The closest sample 
to the one used in the current paper is that 
of [Prokofieva, Muniandy, 2011], who report 
an average independence rate of 40%.
Table 4 also provides information on the 
share of sample firms connected through in-
terlocking directorates. Listed Russian firms 
are highly connected since the share of in-
terlocked companies varies between 75% and 
80%, although this percentage decreased over 
time. In terms of network analysis, this 
means that in the Russian corporate system 
there are large director networks that can 
reach most firms.
Taken together, these results reflect that 
more independent and expert CG practices 
took place in large Russian companies over 
the period observed. Both international ex-
perience and the proportion of independent 
directors have increased, whereas the per-
centage of politically connected directors 
and excessive multiple directorships has fall-
Table 3
Directors’ experience and occupation by year







2009 1102 0.21 0.76 0.50 0.24 0.24 2.59
2010 1124 0.21 0.74 0.47 0.25 0.19 2.46
2011 1124 0.23 0.75 0.48 0.23 0.22 2.28
2012 1149 0.25 0.75 0.49 0.20 0.18 2.31
2013 1124 0.27 0.75 0.46 0.19 0.19 2.16
2014 1094 0.28 0.77 0.45 0.21 0.18 2.32
N o t e:  сolumns “International experience”, “Government experience”, “Industry experience” and “CEO ex-
perience” are the proportion of directors in the sample who have a  corresponding type of work experience. 
“Entrants” indicates the proportion of directors hired in a particular year. The variable “Directorships” reflects 
the average number of other boards for all directors.
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Table 4
Characteristics of the boards of firms in the sample
Variable Year n Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Size of the board 2009 107 10.03 2.57 5.00 17.00
2010 107 10.23 2.74 5.00 22.00
2011 107 10.15 2.55 5.00 19.00
2012 107 10.21 2.48 6.00 18.00
2013 107 10.24 2.65 6.00 18.00
2014 107 10.09 2.57 5.00 18.00
Share of busy directors 2009 107 0.43 0.36 0.00 1.00
2010 107 0.41 0.35 0.00 1.00
2011 107 0.41 0.34 0.00 1.00
2012 107 0.40 0.33 0.00 1.00
2013 107 0.38 0.34 0.00 1.00
2014 107 0.42 0.34 0.00 1.00
Share of independent directors 2009 97 0.25 0.26 0.00 1.00
2010 97 0.27 0.27 0.00 1.00
2011 97 0.29 0.28 0.00 1.00
2012 97 0.30 0.28 0.00 1.00
2013 97 0.32 0.27 0.00 1.00
2014 97 0.28 0.25 0.00 1.00
Share of interlocked firms 2009 107 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00
2010 107 0.80 0.40 0.00 1.00
2011 107 0.75 0.44 0.00 1.00
2012 107 0.75 0.44 0.00 1.00
2013 107 0.75 0.44 0.00 1.00
2014 107 0.76 0.43 0.00 1.00
Share of directors connected with 
CEO (the same board)
2009 107 0.022 0.082 0.00 0.455
2010 107 0.030 0.099 0.00 0.545
2011 107 0.030 0.092 0.00 0.545
2012 107 0.021 0.085 0.00 0.545
2013 107 0.010 0.054 0.00 0.364
2014 107 0.020 0.089 0.00 0.636
Share of directors connected with 
CEO (the same academic institution)
2009 107 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.60
2010 107 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.60
2011 107 0.13 0.13 0.00 0.60
2012 107 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.50
2013 107 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.50
2014 107 0.13 0.12 0.00 0.56
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en. The size of the boards and the proportion 
of busy directors are consistent with large 
European companies. Nevertheless, this da-
ta only provides part of the picture  — the 
next section analyses another perspective of 
CG and networks, and thereby provides 
a  broader understanding of Russian CG.
4.2. Dynamics of network measures
In order to calculate network metrics, we 
used the following two steps:
1) The data collected regarding boards was 
used to identify all existing pairs of direc-
tors. We completed the table in Microsoft 
Access® using a  separate n × n network 
matrix for each year. We assigned  1 to 
a  cell aij if director i and director j are 
included on the same board, and 0 other-
wise. The matrix is thus symmetric. As 
a  result, we had 98  456  pairs.
2) We calculated the chosen network metrics 
using NodeXL software. It is a free, open-
source template for Microsoft Excel® that 
allows for the analysis of social networks 
using the matrix in Microsoft Access®. 
Although the results from the calcula-
tions were not normalized by all possible 
connections in the network, the number 
of directors in the network hardly changed 
between the periods analysed. It was thus 
possible to use non-normalized values.
Table 5 reports the degree, betweenness, 
closeness, and eigenvector centrality of the 
sample directors in dynamics. The definitions 
of the variables are provided in Appendix 1.
The most consistent results are the de-
creasing trends of degree and eigenvector 
centrality. Degree centrality indicates the 
number of each director’s  direct relation-
ships. The other metric, eigenvector central-
ity, describes the relative importance of a di-
rector’s network, taking into account his or 
her neighbour networks. This means that, 
within the network of Russian directors, each 
person was connected to less important direc-
tors in 2014 when compared to 2009, such 
that the relative importance of each director 
decreased. This evolution may be affected by 
the size of the boards. Nevertheless, since 
the average board size, according to Table 4, 
remains more or less the same throughout 
the period studied, the decrease in both de-
gree and eigenvector centrality could be at-
tributed to the fewer connections and lower 
importance of connected directors.
It is worth noting that the relationship 
between closeness and the other metrics of 
centrality is negative and significant (Ap-
pendix 2). Network metrics are normally 
positively correlated [Li et al., 2015; Valente 
et al., 2008]. The negative correlation be-
tween closeness and the other metrics of 
centrality might be due to the evolution of 
the Russian BoD network: the size of the 
networks has not changed significantly, but 
the centrality of directors has decreased. 
Thus, the average distance of each director 
from another has increased. Another pos-
sible explanation is that there may be one 
or several clusters of directors located far 
from the rest of the network, which would 
be consistent with the idea of a more decen-
tralized network.
4.3. Characteristics of the most 
connected firms
In the next stage of our descriptive analysis, 
we studied whether the most connected firms 
differ from the rest of the sample. First, we 
calculate the mean centrality metrics for each 
company. Then, we define the most connect-
ed firms as those in the first quartile of each 
metric. Next, we report some firm-level char-
acteristics (such as size, valuation, ownership 
structure) of both groups of firms. Finally, 
we implement t-tests to check whether there 
are significant differences between the means 
of the most connected firms and the rest of 
the sample. Given the correlation between 
degree and betweenness, we examined both 
metrics simultaneously. However, we ana-
lysed degree and betweenness together be-
cause of their high correlation. The results 
for all of the comparisons are presented in 
Table  6.
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Table 5
Centrality metrics
Year n Degree Betweenness Closeness Eigenvector
2009 1102 15.592 1.840.924 0.03 0.0022
2010 1124 15.149 2.066.205 0.028 0.0017
2011 1124 14.071 2.086.567 0.031 0.0017
2012 1149 13.870 2.353.077 0.030 0.0015
2013 1124 13.536 1.920.505 0.032 0.0011
2014 1093 12.927 1.521.457 0.039 0.0015
Total 6716 14.191 1.968.753 0.032 0.0016
Table 6
Test of mean comparisons of the most connected firms 
Variable
Most connected firms Rest of the firms
n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev.
Panel A: Definition of the most connected firms according to degree and betweenness
Size 118 8.42 0.95 331 7.99*** 1.48
Price-to-book value 107 0.96 0.76 286 1.36*** 1.17
Share of government 
owners
154 22.25 35.35 458 6.17*** 17.30
International experience 159 0.13 0.12 458 0.25*** 0.23
Government experience 159 0.28 0.13 458 0.20*** 0.16
Panel B: Definition of the most connected firms according to closeness
Size 97 7.33 1.38 352 8.25*** 1.37
Price-to-book value 91 1.73 1.52 302 1.19*** 0.97
Share of government 
owners
125 0.00 0.00 487 11.05*** 24.33
International experience 131 0.18 0.21 502 0.25*** 0.22
Government experience 131 0.13 0.13 502 0.23*** 0.16
Panel C: Definition of the most connected firms according to eigenvector
Size 104 8.02 1.06 345 8.07 1.50
Price-to-book value 83 0.96 0.76 310 1.38*** 1.18
Share of government 
owners
159 11.75 27.45 453 8.03*** 20.50
International experience 165 0.11 0.10 468 0.27*** 0.23
Government experience 165 0.29 0.10 468 0.19*** 0.17
N o t e:  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 7
Test of mean comparisons of the most isolated firms 
Variable
Isolated firms Rest of the firms
n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Panel A: Definition of isolated firms according to degree and betweenness
Size 109 7.91 1.46 304 8.08** 1.41
Price-to-book value 87 2.03 1.76 306 1.20*** 0.97
Share of government owners 150 0.00 0.00 462 9.95*** 23.32
International experience 167 0.19 0.20 466 0.24*** 0.22
Government experience 167 0.13 0.13 466 0.22*** 0.16
Panel B: Definition of isolated firms according to closeness
Size 103 7.82 1.16 322 8.14*** 1.48
Price-to-book value 105 1.07 0.95 318 1.37*** 1.16
Share of government owners 118 5.58 14.66 485 9.79*** 23.92
International experience 127 0.22 0.22 490 0.24** 0.22
Government experience 127 0.22 0.16 490 0.20*** 0.17
Panel C: Definition of isolated firms according to eigenvector
Size 116 8.06 1.40 313 8.06 1.43
Price-to-book value 100 1.52 1.23 293 1.24*** 1.09
Share of government owners 140 2.80 11.50 472 10.35*** 23.93
International experience 148 0.27 0.21 485 0.23*** 0.22
Government experience 148 0.16 0.16 485 0.22*** 0.16
N o t e:  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Table 8
Tests of mean comparisons between financial and non-financial firms
Network metrics
Financial firms Non-financial firms
n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev.
Degree 579 13.78 6.26 6138 14.23 10.11
Betweenness 579 1193.81 3586.71 6138 2041.21*** 5835.78
Closeness 579 0.04 0.05 6138 0.03** 0.06
Eigenvector 579 0.0013 0.0045 6138 0.0016** 0.0035
Number of the other boards 62 1.26 2.05 3077 2.45** 3.91
N o t e:  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
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As shown in both Panel A  and C, the 
most connected firms in terms of degree, 
betweenness and eigenvector are larger, have 
a lower price-to-book value, higher degree 
of government ownership and employ direc-
tors with less international experience but 
greater government experience. However, 
the closeness metric offers another result. 
Given the negative correlation between close-
ness and the other metrics, we consider that 
the most relevant results are those in Panels 
A and C. They are consistent with the Russian 
corporate system, and with some large and 
well-connected firms in which the State plays 
an active role (both in terms of ownership 
and presence on the BoD), which does not 
necessarily translate to improved perfor-
mance.
4.4. Characteristics of the most 
isolated firms
We then studied the characteristics of the 
most isolated firms. Again, we first defined 
isolated firms according to network metrics 
distributions. We took into account the low-
est 25  percent of distribution for each vari-
able. Degree and betweenness were analysed 
together for the above-mentioned reason. The 
results of t-tests are presented in Table 7.
As expected, results in Panels A and C show 
that firms with fewer connections are smaller, 
have a high market valuation, and lower gov-
ernment ownership, added to which their di-
rectors have less international and government 
experience. Once again, closeness centrality 
differs from the other metrics.
4.5. Networks of financial institutions
The next stage of the research analysed fi-
nancial firms: banks, insurance firms and 
other financial institutions. The underlying 
assumption was that such firms should have 
better connections because they serve as me-
diators. We compared the means not only 
for network metrics but also for the number 
of outside directorships. The results of t-tests 
are presented in Table 8.
Contrary to our expectations, the results 
show that financial firms enjoy lower central-
ity in terms of betweenness and eigenvector. 
This means that directors of financial com-
panies are not usually important mediators 
in the network, both in absolute terms and 
relative to their neighbours. The number of 
other directorships for directors of such firms 
is also significantly smaller. This result can 
be explained by reference to certain features 
of Russian companies: the choice of financial 
institution is rarely the director’s  decision 
and is instead determined by other factors 
such as the owner’s  decision and relation-
ships. That is why it is not so important for 
these firms to hire particularly central di-
rectors.
Table 9
Tests of mean comparisons between independent and non-independent directors
Network metrics
Independent directors Non-independent directors
n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev.
Degree 1709 14.54 9.44 4132 13.79*** 9.86
Betweenness 1709 1982.99 5450.73 4132 2061.30 6072.57
Closeness 1709 0.0258 0.0529 4132 0.0350*** 0.0643
Eigenvector 1709 0.0019 0.0038 4132 0.0015*** 0.0037
Number of the other boards 840 2.13 3.03 1928 2.45** 3.96
N o t e:  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
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Table 10
Tests of mean comparisons between political and non-political directors
Network metrics
Political directors Non-political directors
n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev.
Degree 1471 17.50 12.47 5010 13.34*** 8.89
Betweenness 1471 3192.11 6473.53 5010 1697.96*** 5504.22
Closeness 1471 0.0182 0.0470 5010 0.0357*** 0.0632
Eigenvector 1471 0.0027 0.0050 5010 0.0013*** 0.0030
Number of other boards 647 2.32 3.00 2468 2.47 3.86
N o t e:  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Table 11
Tests of mean comparisons between state-owned and private firms
Network metrics
State-owned firms Private firms
n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev.
Degree 5133 15.52 10.51 1582 9.90*** 5.32
Betweenness 5133 2371.81 6277.39 1582 660.97*** 2642.78
Closeness 5133 0.0234 0.0508 1582 0.0591*** 0.0770
Eigenvector 5133 0.0021 0.0040 1582 0.0002*** 0.0008
Number of other boards 2299 4.39 4.33 819 3.85*** 3.56
N o t e:  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
Table 12
Tests of mean comparisons between oligarch-owned and non-oligarch-owned firms
Network metrics
Oligarch-owned firms Non-oligarch-owned firms
n Mean Std. Dev. n Mean Std. Dev.
Degree 1817 13.84 9.12 4719 14.58*** 10.17
Betweenness 1817 1609.93 5128.79 4719 2172.22*** 5963.03
Closeness 1817 0.0306 0.0624 4719 0.0296 0.0570
Eigenvector 1817 0.0013 0.0030 4719 0.0018*** 0.0039
Number of other boards 894 3.67 3.52 2198 4.50*** 4.37
N o t e:  *, **, *** indicate significance at the 10, 5 and 1% level, respectively.
4.6. Centrality of independent 
directors
At this stage of the research, we analysed 
how central the independent directors are. 
These directors are supposed to bring experi-
ence and resources to the board, and so should 
be more central and have better connections. 
The results of the relevant t-tests are pre-
sented in Table 9.
In line with our expectations, independ-
ent directors have more direct connections 
(higher degree) and higher relative impor-
tance (higher eigenvector) within their net-
works. They are characterized by lower close-
ness, which could indicate that these direc-
tors offer valuable connections but do not 
necessarily represent the shortest distance 
between different directors. Despite the re-
sults regarding centrality, we can see that, 
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in general, independent directors sit on 
fewer other boards.
4.7. Centrality of directors with 
political connections
Since political connections are very impor-
tant in Russian business, Russian compa-
nies, especially large ones, are likely to hire 
directors with political backgrounds. These 
directors enhance the firm’s  bargaining 
power and both simplify and accelerate the 
solving of important issues. This is one rea-
son why they are included in several boards. 
Thus, the centrality of political directors 
should be higher than that of the rest of 
the network. The results of the relevant t-
tests are presented in Table  10.
As expected, politically connected direc-
tors enjoy greater centrality. They have more 
direct connections than their non-political 
counterparts, they join sub-networks more 
often and have connections with more con-
nected directors. However, despite high re-
sults for the other centrality metrics, we 
observed a  lower value of closeness for po-
litical directors. Thus, the shortest average 
distance between these and other directors 
in the sample is higher. Again, the average 
number of other boards on which political 
directors serve is not statistically different 
to that for non-political directors.
4.8. Centrality of directors in state-
owned and oligarch-owned firms
One particular feature of the Russian eco-
nomic system is the high level of state in-
volvement in the corporate system, particu-
larly in companies that produce strategically 
important goods like gas, oil, metal, and chem-
ical products. Thus, we analysed the central-
ity of directors in state-owned companies. 
Working in s state-owned company provides 
a unique experience that may enhance a direc-
tor’s appeal for other companies. As a result, 
we expect such directors to be more central. 
The main indicators of centrality and the t-
tests for means comparisons are presented in 
Table 11.
Consistent with these expectations, direc-
tors in state-owned companies have more di-
rect connections (higher degree) with other 
directors, more direct connections (higher 
betweenness), and more relative importance 
(higher eigenvector) within their networks. 
They are also busier since, on average, they 
belong to 4.39 boards, while their colleagues 
from non-state companies sit on 3.85 other 
boards.
Another specific feature of the Russian 
economy is concentrated ownership and the 
emergence of controlling owners (so-called 
oligarchs) even in large quoted firms [Dol-
gopyatova, 2003; Lazareva, Rachinsky, Ste-
pa nov, 2008]. Guriev and Rachinsky define 
oligarchs as businessmen who control re-
sources sufficient enough to influence na-
tional politics [Guriev, Rachinsky, 2005]. 
We draw on this definition and have checked 
the Forbes annual list of Russia’s 25 richest 
businessmen. A  person should own at least 
$4.5  bn in order to be included in the list. 
Thus, we assume that the people in this list 
are oligarchs. Accordingly, we analysed the 
firms in which any oligarch owns any stake3. 
Our data confirms the economic importance 
of these people since approximately one-third 
of the firms in the sample are owned by oli-
garchs (Table 12). One might expect two con-
trasting profiles of directors in oligarch-owned 
firms. On the one hand, the special experi-
ence and success stories of these firms could 
attract well-connected directors. On the oth-
er hand, the power of the oligarch could 
eclipse the influence of the board of directors 
to such an extent that highly connected di-
rectors are not so necessary.
The results of the t-tests show that direc-
tors in oligarch-owned companies are less 
central in terms of degree, betweenness, and 
eigenvector metrics. They also hold fewer 
outside directorships. It seems that the 
board of directors does not play such a prom-
3  Mean oligarch ownership is 54.5%, with three 
firms in the sample being totally owned by oligarchs.
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inent role in these firms, which might be 
due to the influence of the main sharehold-
er who, by him/herself may be powerful 
enough to bring knowledge and other valu-
able resources to the firm.
CONCLUSION
This study uses the social network analysis 
to investigate a  number of issues related to 
the BoDs of large Russian companies. One 
important characteristic of the Russian cor-
porate system is the relevance of personal 
relationships for business. Consequently, we 
use social network analysis to verify the con-
sistency of this trend.
Our study examined a sample of 107 list-
ed Russian companies between 2009 and 2014. 
Given the relative underdevelopment of 
Russian capital markets, our sample includ-
ed only the most actively traded large firms. 
Since the unit of observation is a  director 
and each firm employs up to 22  directors, 
we have 6729 director-year observations. Our 
data corroborates one feature of the Russian 
economic system; namely the concentration 
and importance of personal connections among 
directors as, compared to other countries, 
Russian directors have more outside director-
ships. Nevertheless, our preliminary analysis 
confirms improvement in BoDs: independence 
and international experience have increased, 
while the percentage of politically connected 
directors has fallen. Together with these ini-
tial issues, social network analysis draws a com-
plementary picture.
We chose four quite popular network anal-
ysis metrics which have already been imple-
mented for board analysis elsewhere: degree 
centrality, betweenness centrality, closeness 
centrality, and eigenvector centrality. Since 
each of these metrics provides information 
about different network characteristics, they 
are analysed together. Thus, degree is re-
garded as a  metric of popularity, between-
ness is the ability to join sub-networks, close-
ness is the average shortest distance from 
one director to others, and eigenvector pro-
vides information on how connected the nodes 
of the network are to a  particular director.
First, we studied the evolution of these 
network metrics. The most consistent result 
was the decrease in centrality from 2009 
to 2014 (both in terms of degree and ei-
genvector centrality). Since the average size 
of the boards did not change much, these 
results confirm a  trend away from power 
concentration in the hands of just a  few 
directors. Second, we analysed the charac-
teristics of the most connected and the 
most isolated boards according to network 
metrics, and we made some mean compar-
isons with the rest of the sample. Our re-
sults show that the most connected firms 
are larger, have lower market valuations, 
and stronger ties with government (both 
through higher fractions of government 
owned shares and greater numbers of direc-
tors who are former politicians). Third, we 
made some mean comparisons for several 
specific cases: the connections of the boards 
of financial institutions, the connections 
of directors with a  political background, 
and the connections of independent direc-
tors. Contrary to our expectations, the boards 
of financial institutions are less central. 
Both independent and directors with po-
litical connections play a more central role, 
which suggests that these directors are 
hired to bring in valuable resources and 
connections.
Two additional features of the Russian 
economic system are State involvement as 
a shareholder of some firms, and the prom-
inent role played by certain influential share-
holders (so-called oligarchs). We found that 
state-owned firms have a more central posi-
tion in the economy, with their directors 
being better connected and having more out-
side directorships. Interestingly, our results 
suggest that in the firms owned by oligarchs 
the board of directors does not seem to play 
such a relevant role, in the sense that their 
directors are less centralized and are less 
frequently appointed to other firms.
Our findings are useful for academia, pol-
icy makers, and practitioners alike. As for 
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the research, the paper sheds light on how 
Russian companies transfer knowledge and 
resources. Moreover, our research can moti-
vate similar inquiries in other emerging coun-
tries in which business networks play a  rel-
evant role. Also, from a  theoretical point of 
view, our results can be used as a foundation 
for further empirical evaluation of corporate 
centrality outcomes in an intersection of the 
agency theory and resource dependence view. 
As for policy makers, we provide complemen-
tary evidence to traditional corporate govern-
ance indicators. Given the international con-
cern for improving corporate governance, legal 
authorities can find in our research new ap-
proaches for testing the efficiency of rules 
aimed at strengthening national corporate 
governance. Although Russia has some spe-
cific characteristics, the study of the Russian 
case can be interesting for authorities in 
other countries, especially in those with less 
developed markets and for emerging econo-
mies. Personal connections arise as a  way to 
overcome the failures of not very developed 
markets. Thus, the evidence of the Russian 
economic system can help authorities in oth-
er emerging countries to implement political 
measures to exploit the positive side of these 
connections and avoid the negative implica-
tions of these informal mechanisms.
As for practitioners, our research offers 
managers, directors and investors valuable 
guides. Decision makers in firms, such as 
managers and directors, may take advantage 
of our findings when deciding the profile of 
directors who are being considered to join the 
board, in terms of ensuring the transfer of 
knowledge and other resources. In this vein, 
firms can exploit the potential benefits pro-
vided by the most central directors. In addition, 
investors (mainly institutional investors) can 
benefit from our approach by identifying di-
rectors as a source of value for firms and mak-
ing more precise valuations of a firm’s stocks.
Our paper marks a  step forward in the 
use of the social network approach to study 
corporate governance and points the way for 
various lines of future research. An interest-
ing subject of analysis would be the networks 
of the directors of financial institutions. Since 
Russian boards in such institutions are not 
as central as expected, further research should 
seek to shed light on the role of bankers in 
the corporate governance system and its re-
lationship to how firms raise funds. Related 
to this, another possible direction for further 
investigation could be the impact of director 
networks on other firm-level issues such as 
firm profitability, the quality of financial in-
formation and corporate finance, or other 
strategic decisions. Whatever the case, social 
network analysis shows itself to be a power-
ful tool to complement classical corporate 
governance analyses.
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Term Definition Measurement in the paper
1 2 3
Network Representation of a  system in which 
the elements are connected by ties 
[Wasserman, Galaskiewicz, 1994]
Directors that are connected by ties
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Term Definition Measurement in the paper
1 2 3
Node The element of network One director
Tie Direct connection between nodes of 
a  network that are used for sharing 
information, knowledge, feelings, and 
experiences
Connections via formal contacts (board meetings)
Path The direct or indirect connection 
between two nodes. The aggregate of 
ties that information passes through to 
get from element A  to element B 
The aggregate of ties between directors that infor-
mation passes through to get from director A  to 
director B




The number of ties a  given node has The number of directors a director is in direct con-










where i is a  particular director, j  — all directors 
other than i; Xji takes the value 1 if director i and 
director j are on the same board, and 0 otherwise; 
g is the number of directors in the board network
Betweenness 
centrality
The degree to which the same node 
reduces the path distance between all 
pairs of other nodes [Chen, Wang, Lin, 
2015] 
The number of times a  given director acts as a  tie 
to form the shortest path between all pairs of oth-
er directors
 











where ( )jk nig  is the number of geodesics in which 
director j communicates with director k through 
director i; gjk is the number of geodesics in which 
director j communicates with director k; g is the 
number of directors in the board network. The prod-
uct (g  –  1)(g  –  2) is used to eliminate the differ-
ences in board size
Closeness 
centrality
The average length of the shortest path 
between a  node and all the other nodes 
in the network [Chen, Wang, Lin, 
2015]
The average length of the shortest path between 
















where d(i, j) is the distance between director i and 
director j; g is the number of directors in the board 
network
Appendix 1 (continued)
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The extent to which a  node’s network 
centrality is related to that of its 
neighbours [Bonacich, 1972]
The extent to which a  director’s  centrality is 
related to the centrality of directors connected to 
him/her by ties
1 i     ij jjEigenvector    b E  , 
where bij is an adjacency matrix that takes the val-
ue of 1 if director i and director j are on the same 
board, and 0 otherwise; λ is the largest eigenvalue; 
Ej is the eigenvalue of director j’s centrality
Appendix 2




Eigenvector 0.6389*** 0.3538*** –0.2321***
N o t e:  *, **, *** indicates significance at the 1% level.
Appendix 1 (end)
REFERENCES
Adams R. B., Hermalin B. E., Weisbach M. S. 
2010. The role of boards of directors in 
corporate governance: A conceptual frame-
work and survey. Journal of Economic Lit-
erature 48 (1): 58–107.
Andres C., van den Bongard I., Lehmann M. 
2013. Is busy really busy? Board governance 
revisited. Journal of Business Finance & 
Accounting 40 (9–10): 1221–1246.
Barnea A., Guedj I. 2007. Sympathetic boards: 
director networks and firm governance. Eu-
ropean Finance Association Conference. Lju-
bljana.
Blanco-Alcántara D., Díez-Esteban  J. M., 
Romero-Merino M. E. 2019. Board networks 
as a  source of intellectual capital for com-
panies: Empirical evidence from a  panel of 
Spanish firms. Management Decision 57 
(10): 2653–2671.
Böhler D., Rapp M. S., Wolff M. 2010. Director 
Networks, Firm Performance, and Share-
holder Base. Available at: http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1691241 (accessed: 20.03.2020).
Bohman L. 2012. Bringing the owners back 
in: An analysis of a  3-mode interlock net-
work. Social Networks 34 (2): 275–287.
Bonacich P. 1972. Factoring and Weighting Ap-
proaches to Status Scores and Clique Iden-
tification. Journal of Mathematical Sociol-
ogy 2: 113–120.
Cárdenas J.-C. 2015. Are Latin America’s cor-
porate elites transnationally interconnected? 
A network analysis of interlocking director-
ates. Global Networks 15 (4): 424–445.
Comet C., Pizarro N. 2011. The cohesion of in-
tercorporate networks in France. Procedia-
Social and Behavioral Sciences 10: 52–61.
Core  J. E., Holthausen  R. W., Larcker  D. F. 
1999. Corporate governance, chief execu-
tive officer compensation, and firm perfor-
48 M. A. Zavertiaeva, F. J. López-Iturriaga 
РЖМ 18 (1): 29–50 (2020)
mance. Journal of Financial Economics 51 
(3): 371–406.
Chan A. L.-C., Lee E., Petaibanlue J., Tan N. 
2017. Do board interlocks motivate volun-
tary disclosure? Evidence from Taiwan. 
Review of Quantitative Finance and Ac-
counting 48: 441–466.
Chen G., Wang X., Li X. 2015. Fundamentals 
of Complex Networks: Models, Structures 
and Dynamics. Wiley.
Chen H.-L., Hsu W.-T., Chang C.-Y. 2016. In-
dependent directors’ human and social cap-
ital, firm internationalization and perfor-
mance implications: An integrated agency-
resource dependence view. International 
Business Review 25 (4): 859–871.
Chuluun T., Prevost A., Puthenpurackal J. 
2014. Board ties and the cost of corporate 
debt. Financial Management 43 (3): 533–
568.
De B. 2012. Incidence and Performance Effects 
of Interlocking Directorates in Emerging 
Market Business Groups: Evidence from In-
dia. Working paper. IGIDR.
Devos E., Prevost A., Puthenpurackal J. 
2009. Are interlocked directors effective 
monitors? Financial Management 48: 
861–887.
Dolgopyatova T. 2003. Ownership and corpo-
rate control structures as viewed by statis-
tics and surveys. Russian Economic Ba-
rometer 12 (3): 12–20.
Durbach I. N., Parker H. 2009. An analysis of 
corporate board networks in South Africa. 
South African Journal of Business Man-
agement 40 (2): 15–26.
Enikolopov R., Stepanov S. 2013. Corporate gov-
ernance in Russia. In: Alexeev M., Weber S. 
(eds). The Oxford Handbook of the Russian 
Economy. Oxford University Press: N.Y.
Fich  E. M., Shivdasani A. 2006. Are busy 
boards effective monitors? Journal of Fi-
nance 61 (2): 689–724.
Fich  E. M., White  L. J. 2005. Why do CEOs 
reciprocally sit on each other’s boards? Jour-
nal of Corporate Finance 11 (1–2): 175–195.
Freeman L. C. 1978. Centrality in social net-
works: Conceptual clarification. Social 
Networks 1 (3): 215–239.
Frye T. M., Iwasaki I. 2011. Government direc-
tors and business–state relations in Russia. 
European Journal of Political Economy 27 
(4): 642–658.
Goriaev A., Zabotkin A. 2006. Risks of invest-
ing in the Russian stock market: Lessons 
of the first decade. Emerging Markets Re-
view 7 (4): 380–397.
Granovetter M. S. 1973. The strength of weak 
ties. American Journal of Sociology 78 (6): 
1360–1380.
Guriev S., Rachinsky A. 2005. The role of 
oligarchs in Russian capitalism. Journal of 
Economic Perspectives 19 (1): 131–150.
Hayden F. G., Garner A. D., Hoffman J. 2013. 
Corporate, social, and political networks 
of Koch Industries Inc. and TD Ameri-
trade Holding Corporation: Extension to 
the State of Nebraska. Journal of Eco-
nomic Issues 47 (1): 63–94.
Horton J., Millo Y., Serafeim G. 2012. Re-
sources or power? Implications of social 
networks on compensation and firm perfor-
mance. Journal of Business Finance & Ac-
counting 39 (3–4): 399–426.
Iwasaki I. 2008. The determinants of board 
composition in a  transforming economy: 
Evidence from Russia. Journal of Corpo-
rate Finance 14 (5): 532–549.
Iwasaki I. 2013. Firm-level determinants of 
board system choice: Evidence from Rus-
sia. Comparative Economic Studies 55 (4): 
636–671.
Iwasaki I. 2014. Global financial crisis, cor-
porate governance, and firm survival: The 
Russian experience. Journal of Compara-
tive Economics 42 (1): 178–211.
Kawai N., Ko J.-H. 2012. The dark sides of 
institutionalized informal connections: Ev-
idence from the Japanese banking sector in 
the post-bubble crisis era. International 
Journal of Business 17 (3): 238–257.
Kim Y. 2005. Board network characteristics 
and firm performance in Korea. Corporate 
Governance: An International Review 13 
(6): 800–808.
Lai J.-H., Chen L.-Y., Song S. 2019. How out-
side directors’ human and social capital cre-
ate value for corporate international invest-
49Networks of directors on Russian boards: The hidden part of the corporate governance iceberg
РЖМ  18 (1): 29–50 (2020)
ments. Journal of World Business 54 (2): 
93–106.
Larcker  D. F., So  E. C., Wang  C. C. Y. 2013. 
Boardroom centrality and firm performance. 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 55 
(2): 225–250.
Lazareva O., Rachinsky A., Stepanov S. 2008. 
A survey of corporate governance in Russia. 
In: McGee R. W. (ed.). Corporate Governance 
in Transition Economies. Springer: N.Y.
Li C., Li Q., Van Mieghem P., Stanley  H. E., 
Wang H. 2015. Correlation between central-
ity metrics and their application to the opin-
ion model. The European Physical Journal 
B 88 (3): 1–13.
Madhani  P. M. 2017. Diverse roles of corpo-
rate board: Review of various corporate 
governance theories. The IUP Journal of 
Corporate Governance 16 (2): 7–28.
Mendes-Da-Silva W. 2011. Small worlds and 
board interlocking in Brazil: A longitudinal 
study of corporate networks, 1997–2007. 
Brazilian Finance Review 9 (4): 465–492.
Michailova S., Worm V. 2003. Personal network-
ing in Russia and China: Blat and Guanxi. 
European Management Journal 21 (4): 509–
519.
Muravyev A. 2017. Boards of directors in Rus-
sian publicly traded companies in 1998–
2014: Structure, dynamics and performance 
effects. Economic Systems 41 (1): 5–25.
Muravyev A., Berezinets I., Ilina Y. 2014. The 
structure of corporate boards and private 
benefits of control: Evidence from the Rus-
sian stock exchange. International Review 
of Financial Analysis 34: 247–261.
Pfeffer J., Salancik G. R. 2003. The external 
control of organizations: A  Resource De-
pendence Perspective. Stanford University 
Press: Stanford.
Pombo C., Gutiérrez  L. H. 2011. Outside di-
rectors, board interlocks and firm perfor-
mance: Empirical evidence from Colombian 
business groups. Journal of Economics and 
Business 63 (4): 251–277.
Prokofieva M., Muniandy B. 2011. Board com-
position and audit fee: evidence from Rus-
sia. Corporate Ownership and Control 8 
(2): 551–565.
Purkayastha S., Manolova  T. S., Edelman  L. F. 
2012. Diversification and performance in de-
veloped and emerging market contexts: A re-
view of the literature. International Journal 
of Management Reviews 14 (1): 18–38.
Qiao P., Fung H.-G., Ju X. 2013. Effects of 
social capital, top executive attributes and 
R&D  on firm value in Chinese small and 
medium-sized enterprises. China & World 
Economy 21 (4): 79–100.
Santos R. L., Da Silveira A. D. M., Barros L. A. 
2012. Board interlocking in Brazil: directors’ 
participation in multiple companies and its 
effect on firm value and profitability. Latin 
American Business Review 13 (1): 1–28.
Schiehll E., Martins H. C. 2016. Cross-nation-
al governance research: A systematic review 
and assessment. Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 24 (3): 181–199.
Schonlau R., Singh  P. V. 2009. Board Net-
works and Merger Performance. Working 
paper. Carnegie Mellon University.
Silva F., Majluf N., Paredes R. D. 2006. Fam-
ily ties, interlocking directors and perfor-
mance of business groups in emerging coun-
tries: The case of Chile. Journal of Busi-
ness Research 59 (3): 315–321.
Singh D., Delios A. 2017. Corporate gover-
nance, board networks and growth in do-
mestic and international markets: Evidence 
from India. Journal of World Business 52 
(5): 615–627.
Sitthipongpanich T., Polsiri P. 2015. Do CEO 
and board characteristics matter? A study 
of Thai family firms. Journal of Family 
Business Strategy 6 (2): 119–129.
SpencerStuart. 2018. 2018 Russia Spencer 
Stuart Board Index.
Steckler E., Clark C. 2019. Authenticity and 
corporate governance. Journal of Business 
Ethics 155 (4): 951–963.
Valente T. W., Coronges K., Lakon C., Costen-
bader E. 2008. How correlated are network 
centrality measures? Connections 28 (1): 
16–26.
Wasserman S., Galaskiewicz J. 1994. Advanc-
es in Social Network Analysis: Research in 
the Social and Behavioral Sciences. SAGE 
Publications.
50 M. A. Zavertiaeva, F. J. López-Iturriaga 
РЖМ 18 (1): 29–50 (2020)
Withers M., Kim J. Y., Howard M. 2018. The 
evolution of the board interlock network 
following Sarbanes-Oxley. Social Networks 
52: 56–67.
Yigit I., Behram  N. K. 2013. The relation-
ship between diversification strategy and 
organizational performance in developed 
and emerging economy contexts: Evidence 
from Turkey and Netherlands. Eurasian 
Business Review 3 (2): 121–136.
Связи советов директоров российских компаний:  
скрытая часть системы корпоративного управления
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исследовательский университет «Высшая школа экономики», Россия
В статье рассматривается применение сетевого анализа для исследования советов директоров 
107 крупных торгуемых на бирже российских компаний в период с 2009 по 2014 г. Традиционные 
показатели корпоративного управления, такие как демографические характеристики, опыт 
и  вхождение директора в  несколько советов, подтверждают рост их независимости и  квали-
фикации. Результаты исследования свидетельствуют о снижении концентрации власти в руках 
некоторых директоров. Фирмы с  наиболее тесными связями характеризуются крупным раз-
мером, более низкой рыночной капитализацией и более сильными связями с правительством 
(благодаря увеличению как доли акций, принадлежащих государству, так и  количества ди-
ректоров, которые являются бывшими политиками). Кроме того, было обнаружено, что со-
веты директоров финансовых учреждений менее взаимосвязаны, тогда как политические 
и  независимые директора, как правило, занимают центральную позицию в  сети.
Ключевые слова: совет директоров, корпоративное управление, российские компании, сетевой 
анализ.
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